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Exactly fifteen years ago, the Journal of Democracy published in its 
fifth anniversary issue an article by Robert D. Putnam entitled “Bowl-
ing Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.”1 The essay struck a 
chord with readers who had watched their voting precincts empty out, 
their favorite bowling alleys or Elks lodges close for lack of patrons and 
members, and their once-regular card games and dinner parties become 
sporadic.  Marshaling  evidence  of  such  trends,  the  article  galvanized 
widespread concern about the weakening of civic engagement in the 
United States. But it also roused deep interest in the broader concept of 
“social capital”—a term that social scientists use as shorthand for social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trust to which those networks 
give rise. No democracy, and indeed no society, can be healthy without 
at least a modicum of this resource. 
Even though Putnam’s article and subsequent book-length study Bowl-
ing Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community2 focused 
on the United States, scholars and political leaders around the world 
were seized by the question of how to foster the growth and improve 
the quality of social capital.3 This interest was not altogether surprising, 
as research in a variety of fields was demonstrating that social capital 
makes citizens happier and healthier, reduces crime, makes government 
more responsive and honest, and improves economic productivity.4
The trend that “Bowling Alone” spotlighted was alarming: By many 
measures,  since  the  1960s  or  1970s  Americans  had  been  withdraw-
ing  from  their  communities.  Attendance  at  public  meetings  plunged 
by nearly half between 1973 and 1994. The family dinner seemed at 
risk of becoming an endangered species. Trust in strangers took a sharp 
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drop: In the early 1960s, more than half of all Americans said that they 
trusted others; fewer than a third say the same thing today. In the 1990s, 
as Americans’ social connections withered, they increasingly watched 
Friends rather than had friends. Sociologists who had once been skepti-
cal of Putnam’s findings found to their dismay that over the last two 
decades the incidence of close friendships had declined.5 As of 2004, 
a quarter of those polled in the United States reported that they lacked 
a confidant with whom to discuss important personal matters (the 1983 
figure had been less than half that), and nearly half of all respondents re-
ported being only one confidant away from social isolation. Since social 
isolation (that is, the lack of any confidants) strongly predicts premature 
death, these are sobering statistics.
Both Bowling Alone and a 2001 Harvard report known as Better To-
gether6 argued that America could be civically restored in two ways: 
by encouraging adults to socialize more, join more groups, or volunteer 
more; and by teaching the young, whose habits are more malleable, to 
be increasingly socially connected.
Americans need only look back two generations to see just how com-
mitted to civic life a generation can be. The “Greatest Generation” cel-
ebrated by Tom Brokaw’s book of that name grew up amid the sense 
of solidarity generated by the Second World War and before the rise of 
television and its civically noxious influence. In comparison with their 
grandchildren, Americans born before 1930 were twice as trusting, 75 
percent more likely to vote, and more than twice as likely to take part in 
community projects.7 But the Greatest Generation, who viewed helping 
others as downright American, never managed to pass their civic traits 
on to their “Baby Boomer” children (born between 1946 and 1964) or 
their “Generation X” grandchildren (born during the late 1960s and the 
1970s). As its older civic stalwarts have died off, America’s population 
has become less engaged year by year.
Nevertheless, surveying the landscape of the late 1990s, Bowling 
Alone spotted one hopeful trend: an increase in youth volunteering that 
potentially  heralded  broader  generational  engagement.  Putnam  noted 
that the task of sparking this greater engagement “would be eased by a 
palpable national crisis, like war or depression or natural disaster, but 
for better and for worse, America at the dawn of the new century faces 
no such galvanizing crisis.”8 
Newly Engaged? The Rise of the Post-9/11 Generation 
Just a year after those words were written, a massive national crisis 
struck. The terrorists who carried out the 9/11 attacks were aiming to ruin 
America’s confidence and resolve, but the roughly three-thousand days 
that have passed since that fateful day seem instead to have strengthened 
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Whether they were in college, high school, or even grade school when 
the twin towers and the Pentagon were hit, the members of the 9/11 gen-
eration9 were in their most impressionable years and as a result seem 
to grasp their civic and mutual responsibilities far more firmly than do 
their parents. While the upswing in volunteering that Putnam observed 
in the mid-1990s may have been largely an effect of school-graduation 
requirements or the desire to gain an edge while seeking admission to 
selective colleges,10 the years since 9/11 have brought an unmistakable 
expansion of youth interest in politics and public affairs. For example, 
young collegians’ interest in politics has rapidly increased in the last 
eight years, an increase all the more remarkable given its arrival on the 
heels of thirty years of steady decline. From 1967 to 2000, the share of 
college freshmen who said that they had “discussed politics” in the pre-
vious twelve months dropped from 27 to 16 percent; since 2001, it has 
more than doubled and is now at an all-time high of 36 percent.
First-year college students also evince a long-term decline and then 
post-2001 rise in interest in “keeping up to date with political affairs.”11 
Surveys of high-school seniors show a similar and simultaneous decline 
and then rise in civic engagement.12 Moreover, between 2000 and 2008, 
voting rates rose more than three times faster for Americans under age 
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29 than they did for Americans over 30.13 The turning point in 2001 is 
unmistakable. On college campuses nationwide, this civic-engagement 
“youth movement” has evoked the spirit of the early John F. Kennedy 
years.
While the post-9/11 spike in community-mindedness among adults 
was short-lived, the shift appears more lasting among those who experi-
enced the attacks during their impressionable adolescent years.14 Why? 
As we wrote four years after 9/11: 
The attacks and their aftermath demonstrated that our fates are highly in-
terdependent. We learned that we need to—and can—depend on the kind-
ness of strangers who happen to be near us in a plane, office building or 
subway. Moreover, regardless of one’s political leanings, it is easy to see 
that we needed effective governmental action: to coordinate volunteers, 
police national borders, design emergency response preparedness, engage 
in diplomacy, and train police and firefighters. Government and politics 
mattered. If young people used to wonder why they should bother to vote, 
Sept[ember] 11 . . . gave them an answer.15
If this effect persists among young people who lived through 9/11, 
the inevitable turnover of generations will provide the cause of civic 
engagement with a powerful following wind. Amid such generational 
change, even if no present-day adults deepen their community engage-
ment, the United States may witness a gradual yet inexorable reversal of 
the civic decline that Bowling Alone chronicled. 
The final size of the “Post-9/11 Generation” remains unclear, how-
ever, since its lower age boundary is still a mystery. How likely is it 
that those who were grade-schoolers in 2001 will be counted as mem-
bers of this generation? One less than encouraging hint may be gleaned 
from anecdotal evidence suggesting that those born in the early to mid-
1990s increasingly say that they cannot remember 9/11.16 How decisive 
can that day be for those who never had or no longer possess a vivid 
firsthand memory of it? Educators are experimenting with programs to 
freshen the memory of 9/11 among younger Americans, but a solitary 
lesson plan is likely to have far less impact than the raw immediacy of 
the suicide attacks and the pervasive discussions and reflection that fol-
lowed. This suggests that while the 9/11 Generation is real, the attack’s 
effects may be most concentrated among Americans born in the 1980s. 
In his 2008 campaign for the U.S. presidency, Barack Obama ably 
surfed this wave of post-9/11 youthful civic engagement. Though the 
initial ripple had been visible years before he became a national figure, 
he and his campaign mightily amplified it. Some credit Internet-based 
social networking for bolstering youthful interest in politics and com-
munity life, but the advent of the well-known social-networking sites 
Facebook  (2004)  and  Twitter  (2006)  occurred  years  after  the  initial 
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campaign adroitly deployed classic organizing techniques to expand the 
impact of such new technologies. For example, the campaign created an 
iPhone application to enable Obama supporters to rank-order the cam-
paign phone calls that they should make to friends, based on whether 
their friends lived in swing states; it also compiled millions of mobile-
phone numbers and e-mail addresses to mobilize citizens for old-style, 
face-to-face politicking during the campaign and after. Campaign work-
ers exploited cutting-edge technology to find volunteers, decide which 
wards to visit, and record people’s political leanings, but relied on old-
school door-knocking as the chief means of actually connecting with 
voters.
The Obama campaign, with its heavy use of young volunteers and 
workers, not only counted on an upwelling of youth civic engagement, 
but contributed to it as well. In the United States, the share of those aged 
18 to 29 who avowed complete agreement with the claim that “it’s my 
duty as a citizen to always vote” rose by almost 50 percent between 1999 
and 2009. During the same years, the comparable rate among those older 
than 30 stayed flat. A closer look at trends among the 18-to-29 group, 
moreover, reveals a spike in agreement during the years surrounding the 
Obama campaign.17
The long-term civic effects of the Obama campaign on the 9/11 Gen-
eration remain uncertain. If Obama’s campaign promises on issues such 
as health care, financial reform, and equality of opportunity go unreal-
ized, young voters could become politically dispirited. Or perhaps such 
failure would only strengthen their political resolve. As Yogi Berra ob-
served, prediction is hard, especially about the future.
Are Only the Young “Haves” Engaged?
The emergence of the 9/11 Generation since 2001 is undoubtedly to 
be cheered. But it is only part of an ominous larger and longer-term pic-
ture whose main feature is a growing civic and social gap in the United 
States between upper-middle-class young white people and their less af-
fluent counterparts. (A similar gap has not appeared within the ranks of 
black youth, though an overall black-white gap in engagement remains 
wide and troubling.)
Over the last thirty years, and with growing intensity over the latter 
half of that period, white high-school seniors from upper middle-class 
families have steadily deepened the degree to which they are engaged 
in their communities, while white high-school seniors from working- 
or lower-class backgrounds have shown a propensity to withdraw from 
(or never undertake) such engagement.18 Advantaged kids increasingly 
flocked to church, while working-class kids deserted the pews. Middle-
class kids connected more meaningfully with parents, while working-
class kids were increasingly left alone, in large part because single par-14 Journal of Democracy
enting has proliferated among lower- and working-class whites, while 
becoming rarer among upper-middle-class families. Among “have-not” 
high-school seniors, trust in other people plummeted, while seniors from 
the “right side of the tracks” showed no decline at all in social trust. On 
indicator  after  indicator—general  and 
academic  self-esteem,  academic  ambi-
tion, social friendships, and volunteer-
ing—the  kids  who  could  be  described 
as the “haves” grew in confidence and 
engagement while their not-so-well-off 
contemporaries slipped farther into dis-
engagement  with  every  year.19  Among 
other things, this means that the overall 
rise in youth political engagement and 
volunteering since 9/11 masks a pair of 
subtrends that are headed in different di-
rections, with lower-class youth growing 
less involved while better-off youngsters 
become more involved. Since public discussion in the United States of-
ten tends to conflate class and race, it is important to emphasize that 
this growing gap among different groups of young people is about the 
former and not just the latter. 
If the United States is to avoid becoming two nations, it must find 
ways to expand the post-9/11 resurgence of civic and social engagement 
beyond the ranks of affluent young white people. The widening gaps that 
we are seeing in social capital, academic ambition, and self-esteem augur 
poorly for the life chances of working-class youngsters. If these gaps re-
main unaddressed, the United States could become less a land of oppor-
tunity than a caste society replete with the tightly limited social mobility 
and simmering resentments that such societies invariably feature. 
The basic, if unstated, social contract in America is this: We gener-
ally do not worry about how high the socioeconomic ladder extends 
upward (even to the heights scaled by Bill Gates and Warren Buffett), as 
long as everyone has a chance to get on the ladder at roughly the same 
rung. Of course, the image of exact equality of opportunity has never 
been entirely realistic, but as a statement of our national aspiration, it 
has been important, and as the discrepancy between aspiration and real-
ity grows, a fundamental promise of American life is endangered. The 
growing class gap among high-school seniors erodes this promise.
Having noted above that greater engagement on the part of adults 
is another path toward civic restoration, we may ask how adult Ameri-
cans are behaving on this score. Are they becoming more civically en-
gaged? While there is no convincing evidence of such an encouraging 
trend over the last decade, adult Americans are engaging differently. 
Graduates reconnect with lost classmates on Facebook. Stay-at-home 
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moms befriend each other through Meetup. Americans can locate proxi-
mate friends through BeaconBuddy. Brief posts on Twitter (known as 
“tweets”) convey people’s meal or sock choices, instant movie reac-
tions, rush-hour rants, and occasionally even their profound reflections. 
Measured against the arc of history, such technological civic invention 
is in its infancy. In a world where Facebook “friendship” can encompass 
people who have never actually met, we remain agnostic about whether 
Internet social entrepreneurs have found the right mix of virtual and real 
strands to replace traditional social ties. But technological innovators 
may yet master the elusive social alchemy that will enable online behav-
ior to produce real and enduring civic effects. If such effects do come 
about, they will benefit young and adult Americans alike—and fortify 
the civic impact of our new 9/11 Generation. 
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